Generative models are used in an increasing number of applications that rely on large amounts of contextually rich information about individuals. Owing to possible privacy violations, however, publishing or sharing generative models is not always viable. In this paper, we introduce a novel solution for privately releasing generative models and entire high-dimensional datasets produced by these models. We model the generator distribution of the training data by a mixture of k generative neural networks. These are trained together and collectively learn the generator distribution of a dataset. Data is divided into k clusters, using a novel differentially private kernel k-means, then each cluster is given to separate generative neural networks, such as Restricted Boltzmann Machines or Variational Autoencoders, which are trained only on their own cluster using differentially private gradient descent. We evaluate our approach using the MNIST dataset and a large Call Detail Records dataset, showing that it produces realistic synthetic samples, which can also be used to accurately compute arbitrary number of counting queries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances enable the artificial generation of various kinds of data, e.g., images, videos, texts, music. In this context, generative models are emerging as an important area in machine learning. They estimate the underlying distribution of the data and then randomly generate realistic samples according to their estimated distribution. Ideally, such generalization should prevent the model to learn any individual-specific information. However, learning algorithms often fail to provide such privacy guarantees, and overfit on specific training samples by implicitly memorizing them. Thus, even if only internal model parameters are released, they might still pose privacy threats to individuals whose data is used for training.
In this paper, we present a novel approach supporting the differentially private release of generative models. While previous work explored the use of differential privacy in different areas of machine learning, including deep learning [1, 19, 22] , privacy of generative models has not received much attention so far. Traditional anonymization models, such as k-anonymity, are known to fail on high dimensional data, providing poor utility with insufficient privacy guarantees [3] .
A more promising approach is to model the data generating distribution by training a generative model on the original data, and only publish the model along with its (differentially private) parameters [6, 17] . Provided with this privacy-preserving model, anybody can generate a synthetic dataset resembling the original (training) data as much as possible without violating differential privacy. The intuition is that generative models have the potential to automatically learn the general features of a dataset including complex regularities such as the subtle and valuable correlation among different attributes.
In this work, we propose a generative model that is a mixture of k generative Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs).
These ANNs are trained together and collectively learn the generator distribution of the given dataset. The data is first divided into k clusters using a differentially private clustering approach, then each cluster is given to a separate generative neural network, such as Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM) [12] or Variational Autoencoders (VAE) [15] , which are trained only on their own cluster using differentially private gradient descent. A high-level overview of our proposal is shown in Fig. 1 . As the components of our model are neural networks, it can characterize complicated data distributions, and potentially applies to various types of data.
Training distinct generative models on different partitions of the dataset has several benefits. First, multiple models can generate more accurate synthetic samples than a single model trained on the whole dataset, as each ANN is trained only on similar data samples. This prevents the mixture model to generate unrealistic synthetic samples which may arise from the implausible combination of multiple very different clusters. This scenario is much more likely when the training is perturbed to guarantee differential privacy. Second, each ANN models a different component of the generator distribution, and hence learn any specifics of a cluster faster than a single model. In other words, a single model would need more training epochs than a mixture of generative models to achieve a comparably rich representation of the clusters. As each iteration of the learning algorithm requires some perturbation to guarantee privacy, a mixture model needs less noise which eventually yields more accurate model parameters. Finally, separate models provide larger control over synthetic data generation; unlike a single model, our approach allows to choose the component model and generate synthetic data only from the chosen cluster.
Our work builds on the Differential Privacy (DP) framework, specifically, using the Gaussian mechanism [10] . For the data clustering, we use a novel differentially private kernel kmeans algorithm. Kernel k-means [21] is a nonlinear extension of the classical k-means algorithm and has been shown to be equivalent with most other kernel based clustering algorithms [9] . We first transform the data into a low-dimensional space using random Fourier features [20] , and then apply a differentially private version of Lloyd's algorithm [5] to find the clusters in the data. Random Fourier features does not only make kernel k-means scalable for large datasets [8] , but, unlike standard k-means [5] , require to add limited amount of noise to guarantee privacy. Finally, when clusters are created, a generative model is trained on each cluster using differentially private stochastic gradient descent (SGD), which is a standard learning technique of many generative ANNs. Previous works added constant amount of noise to the gradient update in each SGD iteration to guarantee differential privacy. Instead, we add noise to each gradient update which is tailored to the data. We prove that our complete scheme provides differential privacy by using the moment accountant method, proposed in [1] , which allows to quantify the privacy guarantee of the composition of differentially private mechanisms (e.g., noisy kmeans iterations followed by noisy SGD iterations) much more accurately than previous work [11] . In general, the majority of privacy-preserving learning schemes focus on convex optimization problems [4, 7, 23] , whereas, training neural networks typically requires to optimize non-convex objective functions which is usually done through the application of Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with poor theoretical guarantees. Wu et al. [23] propose a private technique which runs SGD for convex cases for a constant number of iterations and only adds noise to the final output. By contrast, in this paper, we introduce a novel differentially private SGD algorithm for optimizing general non-convex loss functions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notation: I denotes a universe of items (e.g., set of visited locations, pixels in an image, etc.), where |I| = m. A dataset D ⊆ 2 I is the ensemble of all items of some set of individuals. A record, which is a non-empty subset of I, refers to all items of an individual from D and is represented by a binary vector x of size m.
Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM). An RBM is a bipartite undirected graphical model composed of m visible and n invisible (or latent) binary random variables denoted by, respectively, v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m ) and h = (h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n ). In our case, visible variables represent the attributes of D and their values are composed of records from D. Hidden variables capture the dependencies between different visible variables (i.e., dependencies between the items in I).
Variational AutoEncoders (VAE) [15] . A VAE consists of two neural networks (an encoder and a decoder), and a loss function. The encoder compresses data into a latent space (z), the decoder reconstructs the data given the hidden representation.
Kernel k-means with random features. Given a set of samples D = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N }, k-means linearly separates D into k (k ≤ N ) so that it aims to minimize the sum of squared error. However, k-means can provide very inaccurate clustering of linearly non-separable data, which are very common in practice. To overcome this shortcoming, kernel k-means [21] first maps samples from input space to a higher dimensional feature space through a non-linear transformation Φ, then applies standard k-means on {Φ(x 1 ), Φ(x 2 ), . . . , Φ(x N )}. Since Φ(·) is hard to explicitly compute due to its large, often infinite dimension, the kernel trick is applied; Φ(x), Φ(y) = κ(x, y), where κ is an easily computable kernel function. To make kernel k-means scalable, the kernel function can be approximated with low-dimensional explicit feature maps. In particular, the samples are first mapped to a low-dimensional Euclidean inner product space using an explicit random feature map z :
to approximate the result of the kernel k-means with implicit feature map Φ and kernel κ [8] .
Differential Privacy (DP). Differential privacy allows a party to privately release a dataset: a function of an input dataset is perturbed, so that any information which can differentiate a record from the rest of the dataset is bounded [10] .
Definition 1 (Privacy loss): Let A be a privacy mechanism which assigns a value Range(A) to a dataset D. The privacy loss of A with datasets D and D at output
where the probability is taken on the randomness of A.
Definition 2 (( , δ)-Differential Privacy [10] ): A privacy mechanism A guarantees (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any database D and D , differing on at most one record, and for any possible output
Intuitively, this guarantees that an adversary, provided with the output of A, can draw almost the same conclusions about any individual no matter if this individual is included in the input of A or not [10] . Differential privacy maintains composition; the privacy guarantee of the k-fold adaptive composition of A 1 , . . . , A k can be computed as follows.
Theorem 1 (Moments accountant [1] 
There are a few ways to achieve DP, including the Gaussian mechanism [10] . A fundamental concept of all of them is the global sensitivity of a function [10] .
For any function f :
Gaussian Mechanism. The Gaussian Mechanism (GM) [10] consists of adding Gaussian noise to the true output of a function. In particular, for any function f :
Proof: See full version [2] .
Given α G (λ), the exact privacy cost ε (or δ) of the k-fold adaptive composition of G is computed based on Theorem 1.
Update parameters of model θs:
In this section, we present our Differential Private Generative Model (DPGM), which is described in Alg. 1 and also illustrated in Fig. 1 . The dataset D is first partitioned into k clusters, denoted byD 1 ,D 2 , . . . ,D k , which are in turn used to train k distinct generative models, where the parameters of the resulting models are denoted, respectively, by θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ k . Data samples are similar within a cluster, thus, generative models simultaneously trained on each partition converge faster than a single model trained on the whole dataset D. As θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ k are learnt using perturbed gradient descent, they can be released and used to generate synthetic data using the k generative models.
Our learning approach involves two main steps: (1) records in D are clustered in a random feature space using differentially private kernel k-means (see Section III-A) into clusterŝ D 1 ,D 2 , . . . ,D k ; (2) a generative model (e.g., RBM [12] or VAE [15] ) with parameter θ i is trained on clusterD i (see Section III-B) using differentially private gradient descent, where the training data are composed of the records ofD i . In each SGD iteration (Line 4-6 in Alg. 1), a model θ s is chosen uniformly at random along with its corresponding training datâ D s , and a single SGD iteration is performed to update θ s using a random sample S ofD s with size L (Line 7 in Alg. 1). The output of our algorithm are composed of the parameters of the trained generative models, i.e., θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ k . Finally, these privately trained k models can be used to generate synthetic records which resemble the original ones, i.e., preserve their general characteristics that are not specific to any single individual (up to ε and δ which is computed in Section III-D).
A. Private kernel k-means
We now discuss our private kernel k-means algorithm, presented in Alg. 2. It first transforms the data D into a lowdimensional representation D = {z(x 1 ), . . . , z(x N )} using randomized Fourier feature map z : R m → R d [20] , and then applies standard differentially private k-means [5] on these low-dimensional features.
Specifically, z : R m → R d is defined as:
where each w i ∈ R m is drawn independently from p(w) = 
where the expectation is approximated with the empirical mean over d randomly chosen values of w and b [20] .
Standard DP k-means [5] releases the noisy cluster centers which are computed iteratively using a noisy variant of Lloyd's algorithm; in each iteration, gaussian noise with scale √ 2σ K is added to the size of all clusters, and with scale √ 2σ K C s to the sum of all cluster members in each cluster. These noisy values are used to compute the noisy cluster centers {ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ k } 1 . To determine the scale of the gaussian noise, the L 2 -sensitivity of the cluster size and that of the sum of norms must be known within each cluster. Although the L 2sensitivity of the set of cluster size is always √ 2 (a single record can change the size of at most 2 clusters), such a priori bound does not exist for the L 2 -norm of the feature vectors in general. Hence, we need to clip all feature vectors in L 2 -norm before applying standard DP k-means, where the clipping threshold C s should be set to the average norm of the feature vectors (i.e., (1/N ) x∈D ||z(x i )|| 2 ) and is approximated by Alg. 3 (see Section III-C). Replacing z(x i ) withẑ(x i ) = z(x i )/ max (1, ||z(x i )|| 2 /C s ) guarantees that all feature vectors are kept as long as their norm is less then C s , otherwise they are scaled down to have a norm of C s .
Nevertheless, for some kernel functions, such as the Radial Basis Function (RBF), a small norm bound C s can be computed analytically -see Theorem 2. Interestingly, this bound is constant for any input data and feature size independently of the width γ of the RBF kernel. Therefore, as opposed to standard k-means [5] , our approach can detect linearly nonseparable clusters, and, used with RBF kernel, add constant noise to feature vectors independently of their size d. Proof: See full version [2] . 
Therefore, DP kernel k-means has two main advantages over standard DP k-means [5] . First, kernel k-means can find linearly non-separable clusters. Second, if it is used with RBF kernel, the added noise is independent of the L 2 -norm of the data records. As we show in Section IV, this can lead to much larger clustering accuracy especially for stringent privacy requirements (i.e., for ε < 0.5) even for large dimensional data.
B. Private Stochastic Gradient Descent
We now present our private SGD technique-Alg. 4 outlines a single SGD iteration. Our starting point is the work by Abadi et al. [1] : similar to theirs, our solution provides differential privacy to the training data by first clipping the norm of the gradient update of each record, and then perturbing these clipped gradients by the Gaussian mechanism. However, we achieve better accuracy as the clipping threshold is selected adaptively in each SGD iteration. In particular, in each SGD iteration, we also (1) compute the gradient of the loss function L on a random subset S of records (denoted as "batch") in Line 2 of Alg. 4, (2) clip the L 2 norm of the gradient of each record in S to have a norm at most C s (in Line 3), (3) add gaussian noise N (0, √ 2σ S C s I) to the average of these clipped gradient updates (Line 6), and finally (4) perform the descent step (Line 7). At the end, the updated model parameters θ are returned. A complete training epoch on the whole dataset D consists of (|D|/L) SGD iterations, which are required to process all records in every cluster on average. Indeed, each record in a clusterD s is selected with
is at most C s , and one record can change at most two clusters.
C. Adaptive selection of the norm bound
Both our private SGD method (in Line 4 of Alg. 4) and private kernel k-means (in Line 4 of Alg. 2) require the differentially private computation of the average L 2 -norm in a given set of records, which is then used as the clipping threshold C s in both algorithms. For this purpose, these algorithms invoke DPNorm which is detailed in Alg. 3. In fact, our SGD technique differs from the original private SGD method [1] in the selection of the norm bound C s (in Line 3-5 of Alg. 4). In the original approach [1] , C s is provided as input to the private SGD and no guideline is given how to compute its value without violating differential privacy. Moreover, the selection of the norm bound C s has a large impact on the performance of the private SGD in general. If C s is too small, there will be slow convergence. Conversely, if it is too large, unnecessarily large gaussian noise will be introduced on the gradient update. Intuitively, C s should be adjusted so that ||g(x ci )|| 2 ≈ C s for each record x ci . This guarantees that the contribution of x ci tog is maximally preserved with the smallest relative error. Hence, instead of fixing C s for the whole training, we aim to compute C s adaptively for each batch as C s = (1/L) i ||g(x ci )|| 2 . This adaptive approach would ensure fast convergence with small error, and also adapt to the gradient update of every batch. Indeed, SGD is iterative, so the gradient updateg of a batch/iteration depends on that of the previous batch/iteration, which means that (1/L) i ||g(x ci )|| 2 is different for each batch.
In DPNorm (see Alg. 2), the computation of the average norm in a set S of records is randomized to guarantee privacy. A naive solution is to add Gaussian noise to this average, i.e., C s = (1/|S|) x∈S ||x|| 2 + N (0, s · σ /L), where s ≥ max x∈S ||x|| 2 . However, max x∈S ||x|| 2 is datadependent and can be too large if there are outliers in S. Instead, we approximate C s such that its value is close to the norm of many records in S, i.e., it is a good approximator of (1/L) x∈S ||x|| 2 . In particular, we discretize the domain of C s by dividing (0, C max ) uniformly into w intervals (Line 1 of Alg. 3). Then, we use the Gaussian mechanism (Line 2 of Alg. 3) to select among the upper bounds C j = jC max /w of these intervals (0 ≤ j ≤ w), which will be the norm bound C s for S. Specifically, we build a histogram where bin i equals the number of records whose gradient norm falls within (C i−1 , C i ]. Then, the (noisy) mode of this histogram is computed by adding independent gaussian noise N (0, √ 2σ C ) to each count, and selecting the bin which has the greatest noisy count. Note that the L 2 -sensitivity of the histogram is always bounded by √ 2 no matter how large max x∈S ||x|| 2 is.
D. Privacy Analysis
Please refer to the full version of the paper [2] .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we compute, empirically, the exact privacy guarantees of DPGM (presented in Alg. 1). We also discuss the results of an experimental evaluation assessing its performance in terms of the quality of generated samples as well as counting (linear) queries computed on the synthetic data. Counting queries provide the basis of many data analysis and learning algorithms (see [5] for examples). Finally, we measure the accuracy of our private kernel k-means described in Alg. 2.
Datasets. We use two datasets for our evaluations, summarized in Table I . MNIST is a public image dataset [16] , which includes 28 × 28-pixel images of hand-written digits, a total of 60, 000 samples. Throughout our experiments, we assume that each of the 60, 000 records originates from a different person. We also use CDR (Call Detail Record) data provided to us by a cell phone operator. For this dataset, I represents the set of cell towers of the operator in a large city with |D| = 4, 427, 486 customers. We use a simplified version of the dataset, which contains the set of visited cell towers per customer within the administrative region of the city over 128.1 km 2 , where the total number of towers is m = 1, 303. The average number of individuals per tower over this period was 38, 817 with a standard deviation of 50, 911.
Experimental Settings. For the RBM, the number of hidden units is set to 200 and the learning rate is 0.01. The biases b and c are initialized to zeros, while the initial values of the weights W are randomly chosen from a zero-mean Gaussian with a standard deviation of 0.01. For the VAE, the number of hidden units is set to 200 with single layer encoder and decoder, and a bi-dimensional latent space. We also used the rectifier activation function (ReLu) for all neurons and the Adam optimizer [14] . For our purposes, it is enough to compute α(λ) for λ ≤ 32. We set the number of the private k-means iterations to 20 and δ = 1/|D|. We also set C max = 10, w = 100 (in Alg. 3), as different values of these parameters do not have a strong impact on the results. We implement DPGM with both RBM (in C++) and VAE (in Python). Experiments are performed on a workstation running Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS, with a 3.4 GHz CPU i7-6800K, 32GB RAM, and NVIDIA Titan X GPU card. Source code is available upon request.
Privacy guarantees. We report the privacy loss ε of DPGM (Alg. 1) in Fig. 2 for the MNIST dataset. Fig. 2 shows ε depending on the number of SGD training epochs, where one epoch consists of 1/q SGD iterations. We note that larger sampling probabilities (q) and more epochs yield larger values of ε, i.e., worse privacy guarantee.
Clustering accuracy. Next, in Fig. 3 , we compare the private kernel k-means (Alg. 2) with RBF kernel with standard DP kmeans [5] . We evaluate the unsupervised clustering accuracy (ACC) [25] , where ACC = max label (x) is the ground-truth label of sample x 2 , K(x) is the cluster assignment obtained by clustering algorithm K, and u is a one-to-one mapping between cluster assignments and labels. The best mapping can be obtained using the Hungarian algorithm. To make a fair comparison, we fix C s to √ m = 28 for standard private k-means without RFF features, and C s = 1 for private kernel k-means with RFF features based on Theorem 2 -i.e., we do not call DPNorm in either of the algorithms. We compute the clustering accuracy for different values of d depending on σ K , which directly yields the privacy bound ε using Theorem 1. Finally, we plot the average accuracy over 100 runs as function of ε in Fig. 3 . 3 Private kernel k-means is clearly superior to standard DP kmeans, as the difference in clustering accuracy can be as large as 20%, especially for smaller values of ε. Shorter RFF features (i.e., smaller d) result in larger accuracy for smaller values of ε, whereas the reverse holds for larger ε. For the rest of experiments, we set d to 200. Selecting the optimal number of clusters k for kernel k-means can be qualitatively and visually done by relying on dimensionality reduction algorithms (e.g., t-SNE [18] ). To this end, one can use public data sampled from the same underlying distribution, and therefore not requiring to make the parameter selection step differentially private. For MNIST we set k = 10, while we select only one cluster for the CDR dataset. We plan to investigate the effects of different values of k as part of future work. with k = 10 clusters on MNIST. For this experiment, we set q = 0.0017 for a final privacy budget ε of 1.74, and performed T K = 20 clustering iterations before training the generative neural networks. Overall, the samples generated from VAE (Fig. 4b) provide higher visual quality than the ones generated from the RBM (Fig. 4c ). Note that the samples generated from the VAE without our private clustering technique (Fig. 4a) have bad visual quality.
Counting-Query. We consider counting queries which are specified by a predicate function p : D → {0, 1} and return the number of users in the dataset which satisfy the given predicate p, i.e., Q p (D) = x∈D p(x). We evaluate the accuracy of counting queries on a synthetic dataset generated by DPGM from our call-data-record (CDR) dataset with roughly 4 million users (see in Table I ). A single query is defined by a subset of tower cells, and returns the number of users in D who visited these cells. We compare DPGM with MWEM [13] , which is a de facto standard differentially private mechanism to answer counting queries. As done in previous work [24] , we measure the utility of a counting query Q p over the sanitized dataset D by its relative error with respect to the actual result over the raw dataset D. The relative error of Q p is thus computed as |Qp(D)−Qp(D)| max{Qp(D),s} , where s is a sanity bound that weight the influence of the queries with small selectivities. Following the convention, the sanity bound is set to 0.1% of the dataset size.
First, we examine the relative error of counting queries with respect to privacy loss ε. 1, 000 counting queries are randomly generated with different number of tower cells, which we refer as the length of the query. Each query set is divided into 5 subsets such that the query length of the i-th subset is uniformly distributed in 1, i·max ||x||1 5 and each item is randomly drawn from universe of items. Fig. 5 reports the average relative error for each query set. This shows that our approach clearly outperforms MWEM. The error of DPGM ranges from 0.017 for 20% query length to 0.0012 for 100% when ε = 1.0. Weaker privacy guarantee (smaller values of ε) lead to slightly smaller errors (Fig. 5b) . By contrast, the error of MWEM 4 ranges from 0.11 to 0.05 even for ε = 2. Also note that the synthetic data produced by DPGM allows the evaluation of arbitrary number of type of queries, not only linear counting queries.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel differentially private generative model, relying on a mixture of k generative neural
